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WARNING! SPEAK AT YOUR OWN RISK: FIRST AMENDMENT
RESTRICTIONS ON OFF-CAMPUS PHYSICAL, EMOTIONAL, OR
CYBER BULLYING
Melissa Anne Springer*

“Once a government is committed to the principle of silencing
the voice of opposition, it has only one way to go, and that is down
the path of increasingly repressive measures, until it becomes a
source of terror to all its citizens and creates a country where
everyone lives in fear.”
- Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress on the Internal
Security of the United States, August 8, 1950
I. INTRODUCTION
You are upset and frustrated after a student called you a string of
rude, offensive names. Your parents always told you that “sticks and
stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me,” and you are
not hurt; you are devastated. To feel better, you create a new blog
website—Bullies Who Bully—and begin typing your first post, pouring
every graphic detail of today’s events into the computer without naming
names. After a few minutes, you post it.
The next morning, you wake feeling terrible again; you relived the
horrible ordeal all over again in a dream. Hoping to feel better, you open
your blog to re-read your post from last night, and, to your surprise, the
post has twenty comments, a few of which recount similar ordeals! You
read through the comments and realize that they are all from other
students at your school: the descriptions of the school hallways, the
other students, and even the school mascot are vividly described.
Inspired, you open the blog so others can post their own stories.
Over the next few months, the number of blog posts skyrockets, each
one vividly and anonymously describing and tormenting at least one
student from your school. Some posts even include drawings that depict
the events either described in that specific post or in relation to another
post on the blog. You created an outlet for students to rant and blow off
steam; however, not everyone sees it that way.
The next morning, the principal calls you into office and shows you
page after page of the posts from your blog, including the very first one
that you composed. You are horrified. The principal explains to you that
the student that you described—initials B.W.B.—told his parents, who
* Executive Editor, University of Cincinnati College of Law Review 2017-2018.

849

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 11

850

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

in turn told the principal. An investigation into the blog and your
conduct follows and, eventually, you are suspended for the content that
you posted on the blog. You and your parents hire an attorney. The
attorney then files a lawsuit against the school district, alleging a
violation of the First Amendment Free Speech rights because you were
suspended for what you posted on the blog. Furthermore, your attorney
explains that this never should have happened because your conduct
occurred off of school property and was not during a school-sanctioned
activity.
Although the history of case law regarding the freedom of speech has
primarily pertained to school speech on campus, “the way students
communicate both inside and outside the school has changed
dramatically.”1 As a result, a wave of recent cases pushed the
boundaries of free speech, wherein numerous circuit courts analyzed
whether schools could restrict students’ freedom of speech relating to
off-campus speech.2 With an increased usage of technology in the home
and in the classroom, the courts must now consider how the freedom of
speech is affected not only in the physical context—e.g., talking to
another person or a physical banner—but also in electronic
interactions—e.g., posting inappropriate photos of another student
online, sexting, cyber bullying, etc.
The main issue in contention between the circuit courts is whether the
First Amendment protects off-campus speech that is perceived as
harassing or intimidating, via either violent or sexual suggestions. In
determining whether the speech is protected, the circuit courts chose to
apply different tests: the Nexus test, the reasonably foreseeable test, or a
fusion of the two. Thus, the main question boils down to what test
should be applied when a court considers whether off-campus speech is
protected under the First Amendment, especially when that off-campus
speech is perceived as harassing or intimidating.
Before delving into a discussion as to what test or tests should apply,
this article briefly reviews the history and evolution of applying Free
Speech in schools. Next, this article discusses the circuit court decisions
that created the circuit split. After the circuit split analysis, this article
argues that the Supreme Court should create a new test specifically for
off-campus speech. This article then analyzes how a possible restriction
of off-campus speech intersects with the parental right to raise children,
followed by a consideration of how this affects children, students, and
individuals in general, as well as the effects of free-speech-suspension
1. Jessica K. Boyd, Moving the Bully from the Schoolyard to Cyberspace: How Much
Protection is Off-Campus Student Speech Awarded under the First Amendment? 64 ALA. L. REV. 1215,
1215 (2013).
2. Infra, notes 14, 15, 16, 17.
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on the youth. In conclusion, this article suggests that a reasonably
foreseeable test should be applied to off-campus speech, specifically for
the adolescent youth.
II. HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH: A DISCUSSION OF THE APPLICABLE TESTS
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3
While not everyone can recite the entirety of the First Amendment, most
can probably list the general freedoms it grants them: freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, and peaceful assembly.4 However, to what
extent is our freedom of speech a protected constitutional guarantee?
Generally, students have a broad freedom of speech in schools:
Students in the public schools do not shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.
They cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal
views on the school premises—whether in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours . . . .5
However, this freedom is not absolute. When reviewing alleged
constitutional violations of a student’s freedom of speech, the Supreme
Court has historically looked to speech inside the schoolhouse gates.
Specifically, the Court created exceptions for speech in special contexts
or restricted environments where ordinary speech-protected rules were
either not applied or were applied in a materially different, and often
greatly diminished, fashion. However, the freedom of speech may not be
restricted unless school “authorities [have] reason to anticipate that
[such expression will] substantially interfere with the work of the school
or impinge upon the rights of other students.”6
For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
the Supreme Court held that school children were not required to
participate in a salute to the flag or to say the pledge of allegiance
because such compulsion “transcend[ed] constitutional limitations on
[local authorities’] power and invad[ed] the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all
official control.”7 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
3. U.S. C ONST . amend. I.
4. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
5. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (internal quotations omitted).
6. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
7. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 11

852

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

School District, the Court held that the students had a First Amendment
right to wear black arm bands in school as a protest against the Vietnam
War because there were no facts on record that would reasonably have
led school officials to foresee a “substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities.”8
In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Bethel School District v. Fraser,
held that the First Amendment did not prevent a school district from
disciplining high school students who gave a lewd speech at high school
assembly because “[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school
officials from determining that to permit vulgar and lewd speech such as
[the student’s] would undermine the school’s basic educational
mission.”9 Similarly, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the
Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent school officials
from “exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
[were] reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”10
In addition, schools may be able to restrict speech that occurs outside
the schoolhouse gates if the speech occurs (1) during normal school
hours, and (2) during a school-sanctioned event.11 If this is the case, then
the school’s rules of student conduct expressly apply; the student may
be restricted from making certain comments; and the school will not
violate that student’s constitutional right to free speech.12 Specifically,
the Supreme Court held, in Morse v. Frederick, that “[b]ecause schools
may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech
that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use, the
school officials . . . did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating
the pro-drug banner and suspending [the student].”13
But what happens when a student speaks off campus and is not
attending a school-sanctioned or school-sponsored event or is not part of
the school’s mission to safeguard students from pro-drug paraphernalia?
Although the general rule might be that the school cannot restrict this
type of off-campus speech, numerous circuit courts have held that
schools may restrict certain off-campus speech.

8. 393 U.S. at 514.
9. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
10. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
11. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, at Syllabus (2007) (permitting schools to restrict student
speech that occurs outside the school if the speech occurred during normal school hours and occurred
during a school-sanctioned event as an approved social event).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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III. MODERN CASES WHERE STUDENT SPEECH DID NOT OCCUR ON
SCHOOL PROPERTY
Circuit courts have recently decided cases arising under the First
Amendment—alleging violations of students’ freedom of speech—in
four different ways: some courts adopt the Nexus test;14 other courts
adopt the reasonably foreseeable test;15 some initiate their own tests;16
and still others refuse to pick and instead apply both.17
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Application of the Nexus Test
In Kowalski v. Berkely County Sch., a high school suspended a senior
student for creating and posting to a social media page on MySpace,
“which was largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student.”18 The title
of the webpage read: “No No Herpes, We don’t want no herpes” and,
although the student alleged that that acronym “S.A.S.H.” stood for
“Students Against Sluts Herpes,” a classmate claimed “S.A.S.H” really
stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” a fellow student at the high
school who was also the main topic of discussion on the webpage.19
After creating the page and inviting others to join, about twenty-four
students from the same high school posted and responded to texts,
comments, and photos on the webpage.20 Of the posts, certain photos
had red dots drawn on a student’s “face to simulate herpes and added a
sign near her pelvic region, that read, ‘Warning: Enter at your own risk”;
another post included a photo of the same student’s “face with a sign
that read, ‘portrait of a whore.’”21 Once the webpage was brought to the
high school administration’s attention, it quickly determined that the
student had created a “hate website,” and suspended the student for
violating “the school policy against ‘harassment, bullying, and
intimidation.’”22
In her complaint, the student alleged that she was unconstitutionally
expelled for five days and that the school “was not justified in regulating
her speech because it did not occur during a ‘school-related activity,’ but
rather was ‘private out-of-school speech.’”23 However, the district court
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See generally Kowalski v. Berkely Cnty Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
See generally S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012).
See generally Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
See generally C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
652 F.3d at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 568-569 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 567.
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granted summary judgment for the school “because [the student’s]
webpage was created for the purpose of inviting others to indulge in
disruptive and hateful conduct, which caused an in-school disruption.” 24
Justifying its conclusion, the district court stated “(1) that [the student]
was on notice that she could be punished for her off-campus behavior
[because she “had received a Student Handbook which included the
School District's Harassment, Bullying, and Intimidation Policy, as well
as the Student Code of Conduct”] and (2) that she was provided with an
opportunity to be heard prior to her suspension.”25
On appeal, the student argued that the school violated her First
Amendment Free Speech rights because her speech involved “offcampus, non-school related speech.”26 However, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision that the school’s actions and
sanctions imposed on the student were permissible:
[T]he School District was authorized . . . to discipline [the student],
regardless of where her speech originated, because . . . [the
student] used the internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a
classmate, and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected
to the school environment as to implicate the School District’s
recognized authority to discipline speech which “materially and
substantially interfere[es] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school and collid[es] with the
rights of others.”27
Thus, even though a student’s speech may occur off-campus, such
speech may be restricted by the school if, “[g]iven the targeted,
defamatory nature of the [student’s] speech, aimed at a fellow classmate,
it created ‘actual or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption in the
school.”28 Finally, when a student “fails to see that such harassment and
bullying is inappropriate and hurtful[,] . . . it must be taken seriously by
school administrators in order to preserve the appropriate pedagogical
environment.”29 As such, “where such speech has a sufficient nexus
with the school [regardless of whether it is on-campus or off-campus],
the Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators’ good

24. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
25. Id. at 569-570.
26. Id. at 570.
27. Id. at 574. 567 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969)).
28. Id. at 574 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
29. Id. at 577.
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faith efforts to address the problem.”30
B. The Eighth Circuit Application of the “Reasonably Foreseeable”
Test
In S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., twin brothers were
suspended for 180 days after they created a blog intended “to discuss,
satirize, and ‘vent’” about events at their high school.31 Although the
website used an international domain site that prevented users in the
United States from finding the website via a general search, anyone
could access the website if they knew the web address.32 A few of their
“posts contained a variety of offensive and racist comments as well as
sexually explicit and degrading comments about particular female
classmates, whom they identified by name.”33 Although non-school
computers were used for the majority of the events surrounding the
website, one of the students “used a school computer to upload files
needed to create [the website].”34 The twin brothers were suspended
from school for 180 days after the school administrators discovered the
website and its contents.35
Even though the district court noted that the website “caused
considerable disturbance and disruption,” it also determined that the
students’ inability to participate in extracurricular activities or attend
honor classes “constituted irreparable harm.”36 Thus, the district court
granted the students’ motion for preliminary injunction and allowed
them to return to the school; however, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the preliminary injunction because, among other reasons, the
plaintiffs “[were] unlikely to succeed on the merits.”37
Regarding the plaintiffs’ likely success on the merits, the Eighth
Circuit analyzed the protection of off-campus speech under Tinker,38
stating it was unlikely the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits
because the plaintiff’s website “posts caused a substantial disruption.”39
“Thus, student speech that causes a substantial disruption is not
protected.”40
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 775-776.
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id. at 777.
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C. The Fifth Circuit Application of the “Reasonably Foreseeable” Test
In Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Dist., the Fifth Circuit held that
summary judgment was appropriate for a lawsuit pertaining to a highschool student’s rap song, recorded off-campus with the use of school
equipment and posted on social media, when (1) the song described
“threatening, harassing, and intimidating language” towards two
coaches;41 and (2) the student intended for the song to be heard by the
school community.42
First, the Fifth Circuit established “the extent to which off-campus
student speech may be restricted without offending the First
Amendment.”43 Via a brief discussion by the court, “Tinker applies to
off-campus speech in certain situations.”44 Furthermore, Tinker applies
as a particular response to “the paramount need for school officials to be
able to react quickly and efficiently to protect students and faculty from
threats, intimidation, and harassment intentionally directed at the school
community.”45
Second, the Fifth Circuit delved into answering the question, “under
what circumstances may off-campus speech be restricted.”46 As
previously noted by the court, “over 45 years ago, . . . the Internet,
cellphones, smartphones, and digital social media did not exist. The
advent of these technologies and their sweeping adoption by students
present new and evolving challenges for school administrators,
confounding previously delineated boundaries of permissible
regulations.”47 Thus, “schools can be places of special danger,”
especially with the increased use of technology.48 Acknowledging that
threatening, intimidating, and harassing language creates “tension
between a student’s free-speech rights and a school official’s duty to
maintain discipline and protect the school community,”49 the court
concluded:
The pervasive and omnipresent nature of the Internet has
obfuscated the on-campus/off-campus distinction advocated by
[the
plaintiff],
“mak[ing]
any
effort
to
trace First
41. 799 F.3d 379, 384-385 (5th Cir. 2015).
42. Id. at 383 (the plaintiff posted the recording “on the Internet (first on his publicly accessible
Facebook profile page and then on YouTube), intending it to reach the school community.”).
43. Id. at 393.
44. Id. at 394.
45. Id. at 393.
46. Id. at 394.
47. Id. at 392.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Amendment boundaries along the physical boundaries of a school
campus a recipe for serious problems in our public schools.”
Accordingly, in the light of our court's precedent, we hold
Tinker governs our analysis, as in this instance, when a student
intentionally directs at the school community speech reasonably
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a
teacher, even when such speech originated, and was disseminated,
off-campus without the use of school resources.50
Thus, the school officials acted reasonably, and summary judgment
was appropriate because “the school board reasonably could have
forecast a substantial disruption at school, based on the threatening,
intimidating, and harassing language” in the song.51
D. The Ninth Circuit Application of Both the Nexus Test and the
“Reasonably Foreseeable” Test
In C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J,52 the Ninth Circuit did not join either
side of the current circuit split but instead paved its own course, holding
that both tests apply. In making its decision, the court reviewed the
pertinent facts: over several days, the defendant along with a few other
seventh-grade boys followed and teased two sixth-grade students on
their way home from school.53 Both of the sixth-grade students were
disabled, and the “teasing” occurred as the students traveled along the
same route from the school to their homes, including along an area the
school administrators called “the back field.”54 Eventually, the “teasing”
escalated: the defendant, accompanied by the other seventh graders,
gave the six-graders vulgar nicknames, and made sexual jokes, a series
of which referred to oral sex.55 When the school was informed and after
an internal investigation, wherein all the alleged participants and victims
were interviewed, all the participants were disciplined; the defendant
received a two-day, out-of-school suspension.56 The defendant’s parents
50. Id. at 395-396. (quoting Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220-221 (3rd Cir.
2011) (Jordan, J., concurring)).
51. Id. at 400.
52. 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
53. Id. at 1146.
54. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Each child involved took the same route home from school:
“a bike path leading from the school, across a public park, to a neighboring street. The park borders the
school’s athletic fields, but there is no visible boundary to indicate where school property ends and the
park begins. On the far side of the park, across from the school, is a track belonging to the School
District. The school’s administrators casually refer to the park, track, and fields collectively as ‘the back
field.’” Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1145-1147.
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sued the school district, alleging violations of the defendant’s First
Amendment and due process rights.57
Affirming the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for
the school district, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s
suspension by the school district was permissible,58 and it also noted:
To determine whether a school properly disciplined a student for
off-campus speech requires us to answer two questions: First, we
consider the threshold question of whether the school could
permissibly regulate the student’s off-campus speech at all. Next,
we consider the question of whether the school’s regulation of the
student’s
speech
complied
with
the First
Amendment’s requirements. 59
Thus, the Ninth Circuit analyzed to what extent a school may regulate
and restrict student speech, and then whether the school district had the
authority to restrict the defendant’s off-campus speech.60
The Ninth Circuit first recognized that there are four types of student
speech that schools may regulate and restrict: “(1) vulgar, lewd,
obscene, and plainly offensive speech”61; “(2) school-sponsored
speech”62; “(3) speech promoting illegal drug use”63; and “(4) speech
that falls into [none] of these categories . . . .”64 However, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that these four types of speech pertained to oncampus speech, and the Supreme Court had yet to answer how courts
should treat off-campus speech.65
The Ninth Circuit continued by distinguishing the facts at hand from
those of other circuits: “the vast majority of law in this area concerns
school officials’ authority to discipline students for internet speech. In
this case, nothing was put into writing, and the students’ speech was
never shared online.”66 To determine whether off-campus student speech
could be restricted, the court looked to both the Nexus test and the
“reasonably foreseeable” test. Under the Nexus test, the Ninth Circuit
57. Id. at 1147.
58. Id. at 1148.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 1148-1152.
61. Id. at 1148 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
62. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n. 4 (1988)) (internal
quotations omitted).
63. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted).
64. Id. at 1149 (quoting Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013))
(internal quotations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1150.
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determined, “[a]lthough the harassment at issue in this case took place
off school property, it was closely tied to the school.”67 Thus, the court
held that it was “a reasonable exercise of the School District’s in loco
parentis authority to be concerned with its students’ well being as they
beg[a]n their homeward journey at the end of the school day.”68
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit determined that the “reasonably
foreseeable” test applied: “[b]ecause the harassment happened in such
close proximity to the school, administrators could reasonably expect
the harassment’s effects to spill over into the school environment” and
“[a]administrators could also reasonably expect students to discuss the
harassment at school.”69
Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied both the Nexus and “reasonably
foreseeable” tests mentioned in Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.,70
concluding “that under either test, the School District had the authority
to discipline [the defendant] for his off-campus speech.”71
E. LaVine & Wynar: Additional Ninth Circuit Cases Dealing with First
Amendment Restrictions on Off-Campus Speech
In LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., a student wrote poem from the
perspective of the school shooter.72 A few months later, the student
found the long-forgotten poem and brought it into school for his
teacher’s feedback.73 Disturbed by the poem’s content, the teacher
brought it to the attention of the school’s administration, who decided to
“emergency expel” the student out of extreme caution.74 In a suit
brought by the student, alleging a First Amendment violation, the Ninth
Circuit held that the student’s expulsion was not a violation of his First
Amendment rights because of its violent content.75 The Ninth Circuit
did not discuss how the poem’s creation off-campus played into their
decision; however, off-campus origins was later considered and
discussed by the Ninth Circuit in 2013: “the location of the speech can
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1151.
69. Id.
70. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) is discussed later in
this article.
71. Eugene, 835 F.3d at 1150. The court continued, stating “Our decision is necessarily restricted
to the unique facts presented by this case: The speech at issue occurred exclusively between students, in
close temporal and physical proximity to the school, on property that is not obviously demarcated from
the campus itself. A school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without
implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community.” Id. at 1152.
72. 257 F.3d 981, 983-984 (9th Cir. 2001).
73. Id. at 984.
74. Id. at 984-985 (internal quotations omitted).
75. Id. at 990.
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make a difference . . . not . . . all off-campus speech is beyond the reach
of school officials.”76
In Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., a student sent a series of
messages to friends via social media, threatening to commit a school
shooting.77 Even though the messages were composed and sent from the
student’s home computer, the Ninth Circuit held that the school did not
violate the student’s First Amendment rights by suspending him
because, “when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence,
schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus
speech.”78 Thus, the Ninth Circuit declined to choose between the
Fourth Circuit’s application of the Nexus test and the Eighth Circuit’s
application of the “reasonably foreseeable” test.79 Instead, the court
decided both were satisfied when a student threatens a school shooting.80
IV. ARGUMENT
Due to the current circuit court split, the main question is whether the
First Amendment protects off-campus speech that is perceived as
harassing or intimidating, via either violent or sexual suggestions. As
demonstrated, the circuits that have already heard and decided this issue
have applied the Nexus test, the “reasonably foreseeable” test, or both.
As the Ninth Circuit mentioned in Eugene, there are four general tests
applicable to on-campus speech: “(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly
offensive speech”81; “(2) school-sponsored speech”82; “(3) ‘speech
promoting illegal drug use’”83; and “(4) speech that falls into [none] of
these categories . . . .”84 At the very least, any court going forward
should consider whether a school district’s restriction on a student’s offcampus speech is a violation of the student’s First Amendment rights
under Tinker. However, this should not become the court’s sole tool in
its analysis; the courts should also consider the student’s intent for the
speech when applying the First Amendment tests. Furthermore, courts
could draw a symbolic line in the sand between off-campus and on76. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013).
77. Id. at 1065.
78. Id. at 1069.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Eugene, 835 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n.
4 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n. 4 (1988)) (internal
quotations omitted).
83. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted).
84. Id. at 1149 (quoting Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013))
(internal quotations omitted).
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campus speech, “having no authority to regulate any speech or
expression that does not occur on school grounds or at a schoolsanctioned event.”85 Nonetheless, this solution is too extreme because
“speech uttered exclusively outside of the confines of the school could
still disrupt the school in its task of educating children as much as
speech spoken in the classroom.”86 Thus, it will behoove courts,
including the Supreme Court, to create a different, albeit similar, test to
help navigate the crossroads of off-campus speech and First Amendment
Free Speech as technology becomes increasingly more prevalent in
everyday life.
A. The Supreme Court Should Create a New Off-Campus Speech Test
Aside from Morse, the Supreme Court developed all of the free
speech tests almost 30 years ago, during a time when computers were
not in every household and when smartphones, tablets, the Internet, etc.
were non-existent.87 In response to the rise of technology and the
plethora of violence therefrom, the circuit courts attempted to apply the
current Free Speech tests; however, this application—specifically the
Nexus and “reasonably foreseeable” tests—may give the school districts
too much leniency in determining when a student crosses the line into
unprotected speech. Therefore, the Supreme Court should create a new
test wherein the multiple elements considering whether a student’s
speech is or is not protected are balanced against each other. Generally,
“[s]chools must tolerate students’ unpopular religious and political
opinions within the school and at school-sanctioned activities”;
however, “students’ rights in the school context are not automatically
‘coextensive’ within the rights of adults in a public setting.”88 Thus, the
courts must balance the priorities of both the students and the school
district.89
Element 1. What is the Student’s Intent Behind the Off-Campus
Speech?
As demonstrated in the circuit court cases above, “on-campus and offcampus distinction is becoming increasingly difficult with the
85. Boyd, supra note 1 at 1232.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1217.
88. Id. at 1231.
89. Id. at 1231-1232 (“A students’ right to freely express his political and religious beliefs inside
the school has to be weighed against the school’s task of ensuring its students learn ‘socially appropriate
behavior’ in order to function in our society.”) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 681 (1986)).
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instantaneous nature of the Internet.”90 Therefore, almost any
communication can “foreseeably make its way to a school campus,”91
creating an insurmountable difficulty for school officials and the courts.
By looking to the student’s intent behind the off-campus speech, school
officials can determine whether it “has sufficient basis for jurisdiction”
and can, therefore, restrict the student’s speech.92 Furthermore, the intent
behind the student’s speech could, theoretically, “protect more students
from schools overstepping their jurisdictional bounds to punish offcampus communication.”93 Nevertheless, a student’s intent, by itself,
may not be enough to satisfy a new test: “schools should not be able to
use [intent] as an excuse to regulate everything a student says.”94
However, “students should not be allowed to have free reign to cause
significant disruptions at school from the privacy of their own homes
and never suffer any type of consequence.”95
Therefore, the main questions regarding intent should be: (1) whether
the student intended for other students at her school to read her blog
posts off-campus; (2) whether the student intended for her speech to
reach students both on- and off-campus; and (3) whether the student
intended for the speech to mean more than an adolescent equivalent of
blowing off steam. These three issues are suggestions of ways a court
can analyze a student’s intent behind off-campus speech. Recognizing
that a statement may be rehearsed and prepared with the assistance of
counsel, the court should, at the very least, hear and consider a statement
made by the student whose off-campus speech resulted in an alleged
First Amendment violation.
Element 2. Does the Student’s Speech Create a True Threat to the Other
Students, Teachers, or School Officials?
A court’s inquiry into whether a school’s restriction on a student’s
off-campus speech violates the student’s First Amendment Free Speech
rights should begin with the true threat doctrine once intent is
considered.96 Applying this doctrine “would ensure students’ threatening
speech could be proscribed so schools can maintain a safe environment
for their students and employees.”97 Although the true threat doctrine

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
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traditionally applied only to “a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence,” the courts can expand it “in the school
context to include threats of physical violence or harm as well as threats
to harm a person’s reputation or other threats that are equally damaging
mentally and emotionally that could be properly characterized as
cyberbullying.”98
With the rise in technology, cyberbullying is becoming an everincreasing threat to both the physical and mental safety of children.99
Although bullying may likely be categorized as “more of a nuisance
than a threat, . . . if a student bullies another student or teacher and that
communication can be characterized as a threat, the school should be
able to properly discipline that student without violating his or her free
speech rights.”100 Thus, if a school could protect bullying that reached
the level of a true threat due to “damaging speech, students . . . would
not be entitled to First Amendment protection and would be further
deterred from taking their bullying from the schoolyard to
cyberspace.”101
Element 3. Does the Speech Have Special Educational Qualities?
The Tinker test “is not automatically implicated” simply “because the
speaker is a student.”102 In Bell, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the student
speech from the point of view of the school, rather than from that of the
student. As stated by Katherine E. Geddes, “[t]he Fifth Circuit’s initial
starting point misses the mark”103 because the Fifth Circuit analyzed the
situation from the school’s perspective rather than the student’s
perspective.104 Thus, the Fifth Circuit improperly applied Tinker to the
student’s rap lyrics because “Tinker’s holding is expressly grounded in
the ‘special characteristics of the school environment.’”105 As a result,
the Fifth Circuit inappropriately applied Tinker to Bell’s rap lyrics “that
inherently lack[] those special educational qualities.”106 This
98. Id. at 1234.
99. Id. (noting that “[a]ccording to recent statistics, approximately one million students were
subjected to some form of cyberbullying on Facebook alone in the year 2011” and that “about 20% of
students claim they have been bullied through the Internet”).
100. Id. (noting that “the student in Kowalski created a fake MySpace profile that was extremely
degrading to a fellow student”).
101. Id.
102. Katherine E. Geddes, First Amendment—Student Speech—Why Bell Tolls a Review of
Tinker’s Application to Off-Campus Online Student Speech, 69 SMU L. REV. 275, 280 (2016)
(hereafter, “Geddes, Bell Tolls a Review”).
103. Id. at 279.
104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. Id.
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misapplication can easily be removed: before restricting a student’s offcampus speech, the court should positively determine that the
questionable student speech has “special educational qualities.”107
To determine whether the speech has “special educational qualities,”
the court should consider whether (a) the student’s off-campus speech
(b) in its entirety and in its original context (c) will negatively affect the
learning process. For example, in Bell, the rap lyrics targeted two
coaches.108 However, “while one of the coaches said the rap made him
feel ‘scared,’ the other testified that the song was ‘just a rap,’ nothing to
be threatened by.”109 This analysis would ensure that the student could
be reprimanded for harassing, intimidating, or threatening speech, but
only if the speech hinder the education of other students. Without “an
analysis of the speech in its entirety” and “[w]ithout including a
contextual analysis,” courts applying the Fifth Circuit’s holding “will
likely have broad practical implications because it will regulate
protected speech, chilling student speech overall.”110
Thus, schools and courts should only restrict student speech “based
on the message a speaker conveys”111 in its entirety. A student’s offcampus speech “may be offensive, perhaps even ‘lewd’ or ‘lascivious,’
but that alone should not provide a basis for banning it or sanctioning its
use.”112 Similar to Justice Marshall Harlan’s comment “one man’s
vulgarity is another’s lyric . . . [,] one educator’s moment of panic in the
face of student speech that she disagrees with is another’s opportunity to
instruct . . . .”113 Courts considering the “special educational qualities”
of the student’s speech would ensure that educators and school officials
“use both judgment and reason to help students learn, rather than the
cudgel of discipline to instill a reflexive rejection of speech (and ideas)
that fall outside the collective norms.”114
Element 4. How Many People Had Access to the Student’s Speech; Did
Anyone Access the Speech from Inside the School?
Stemming from the “special educational qualities” test, the number of
107. Id.
108. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Bell, a student . . .
posted a rap recording containing threatening language against two high school teachers/coaches on the
Internet . . . . ”).
109. Geddes, supra note 102, at 280.
110. Id. at 280-281.
111. Mark R. Killenbeck, Special Remarks on Student Speech: Activities that Require Judgment
and Reason? 68 ARK. L. REV. 883, 891 (2016) (internal quotation omitted).
112. Id. at 893.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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people who had access and whether the student’s speech was accessed
from inside the school ultimately pertain to whether schools, and
therefore courts, can restrict students’ off-campus speech. First, while
“[i]t is certainly true that some students may be especially immature and
vulnerable . . . . [,] most students . . . do not shed their brains at the
schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy [and
inappropriate speech] when the see [and hear] it.”115 By considering the
total number of students exposed to another’s off-campus speech, school
officials and courts will better determine whether the student body as a
whole would consider the off-campus speech as hindering their
collective education. To consider other solutions and to “[t]reat[] [the
students] otherwise is an insult to their intelligence and a disservice to
them, their families, and the communities they will eventually live in
and serve.”116
If, in addition to considering how many students accessed the offcampus speech in total, officials and courts consider how many accessed
the speech at school, they will be better positioned to determine whether
the student body as a whole was negatively affected. Specifically, by
determining the number of students affected, school officials can easily
turn a moment of offensive vulgarity into a moment of instruction on the
value of free speech. Furthermore, if the off-campus speech was brought
onto school grounds, school officials may have more control over how
to react to the speech. By bringing the off-campus speech onto school
grounds, the off-campus speech may inadvertently become on-campus
speech. Therefore, school officials may have more leeway in restricting
such speech.
B. Applying the Proposed Test
Recall the scenario presented in this article’s Introduction, where a
student created a blog, posted harmful comments, and allowed others to
add their own comments and posts.
V. HOW DOES THIS INTERSECT WITH THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO RAISE
KIDS?
Kids fall from trees (because they climb them in the first place); they
eat dirt (an average total of almost six pounds over a person’s life);117
115. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 444 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotations omitted).
116. Id.
117. Strange Facts—The Average Person Eats 6 Lbs of Dirt in Their Lifetime,
HealthCareDailyOnline (April 29, 2015), http://www.healthcaredailyonline.com/psychology/strange-
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and they say adorable things. However, with “the recent trend toward
‘helicopter parenting’”118and others vehemently opposing it, strangers
and law enforcement are beginning to believe some parents are
“exposing their children to unacceptable levels of danger.”119 As a
result, public entities and individuals other than a child’s parents impose
their own personal views on child rearing, a sudden breach of a parents’
Fourteenth Amendment rights.120
“At the core of the conflict is the ongoing debate about what
constitutes responsible parenting in a world increasingly obsessed with
child safety.”121 As a result of increased media attention on child
abduction, child abuse, and other potential dangers, parents are everincreasingly erring on the side of overprotection.122 Yet, “[t]here is
mounting evidence that such overprotection does more harm than good,
but parents . . . who resist the hyper-parenting trend, are running afoul of
the legal system.”123 Furthermore, “[t]he spate of news items suggests a
trend toward enhanced, arguably invasive, scrutiny of parents, with the
state second-guessing the parenting decisions they make, and
intervening whenever they disagree with the parents’ judgment call.”124
Although “[t]he intrusions are made in the name of protecting children
from harm, a public policy objective that is both easy to defend and hard
to dismiss,” the “disruption of the family in this way—removing or even
threatening to remove kids from their families—can do tremendous
harm to children, the very children the state is trying to protect, and in
many cases contravene the family’s fundamental liberty interests
. . . .”125 In a similar vein, when a school restricts a student’s off-campus
speech, parents may argue that the school is now intruding on the
parental right to discipline and raise children as the parents see fit.
Consider a situation wherein parents allow their ten-year-old and sixyear-old children to walk from the neighborhood playground back to
their home; however, on their way home, a stranger calls the police,
believing the children are in peril.126 The police bring the children home
facts-the-average-person-eats-6-lbs-of-dirt (last visited April 11, 2017).
118. David Pimentel, Protecting the Free-Range Kid: Recalibrating Parents’ Rights and the Best
Interest of the Child, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2016).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 19 (“While the Supreme Court has recognized that parents enjoy a fundamental
liberty interest in their decisions about how to raise their children, those Fourteenth Amendment rights
are not being adequately protected.”).
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id. at 1 (“In January 2015, the [] children, ages ten and six, were permitted to do a short walk
on their own, from the neighborhood playground back to their home in Silver Spring, Maryland. Their
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and threaten to remove the children from the home.127 Soon thereafter,
the state commences an abuse and neglect investigation simply because
the children walked, unsupervised, from a public playground back to
their home.128 Now compare this situation to the following one: parents
allow their child to have unrestricted access to a personal laptop, even
though their original intention was to give their child a computer for
school use. Thereafter, their child proceeds to post threatening,
harassing, or intimidating content about others students online. School
officials hear about the content posted online by the child, proceed to
expel the child because of the content, and even contact the police
because the school believes the content rises to the level of violence
against another child. The parents know nothing of these events until
they attend the expulsion hearing at the school, and receive a personal
visit by the police at their home. The police threaten to investigate and
to proceed with legal action.
Comparing both the “free-range kids” walking home and the “freerange kids” posting online, almost all “[p]arents caught in this nightmare
are well advised to cooperate quickly, apologize profusely, and promise
it won’t happen again . . . in order to avoid having their children taken
away from them”129 or to avoid their children receiving a school
suspension or, worse yet, an expulsion. However, “protecting the rights
of parents to parent as they see fit—safeguarding their discretion in
parenting, including issues of risk-management for their children—is
likely to do far more to advance the interests of the children than the
emerging pattern of state intervention can hope to achieve.”130
“Free-range parenting” is applicable to numerous scenarios, including
the two mentioned above. “Free-range parenting” is described as:
[A] reaction to the present-day obsession with child-safety, and the
emerging parenting norms that reflect those fears. . . . Preteen
babysitters, sandlot baseball, bike riding in the neighborhood, and
tree-climbing, once staples of childhood in America, are now relics
of history. . . . Free-range parents . . . mourn the loss of freedom
for today’s kids, and argue that kids are actually far worse off
because of these ‘safety’ measures. . . . [And] today’s coddled kids
parents designed this exercise to help the children develop some independence and self-sufficiency, and
did so only after the children had completed other smaller challenges to prepare them for this one. But
the parenting lesson was quickly disrupted when someone saw the children walking alone and reported
it to the police.”).
127. Id. (“The children were picked up by police, the father was threatened with removal of the
children from his custody . . . .”).
128. Id. (“[T]he State of Maryland commenced an abuse and neglect investigation.”).
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 6.
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not only lose a sense of discovery and exploration when they are
kept home and under nonstop adult supervision, they are deprived
of an opportunity to develop self-sufficiency and or to learn to take
responsibility for themselves.131
Parenting is “an exercise in risk management.”132 Allowing kids to walk
to school, to wait alone at the bus top, “certainly exposes them to some
risk; but keeping them indoors where they will be ‘safe,’ . . . certainly
exposes them to a variety of other harms,”133 including restrictions on
their First Amendment Free Speech rights. “If parents face liability for
exposing children to risk, they have lost before they begin, because the
risks cannot be eliminated, only managed . . . .”134
As mentioned earlier, while “[i]t is certainly true that some students
may be especially immature and vulnerable . . . [,] [m]ost students . . .
do not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most students know
dumb advocacy [and inappropriate speech] when the see [and hear]
it.”135 Thus, parents who grant their children unrestricted access to a
computer do, in fact, expose their children to some risk; however, those
risks are managed risks, hopefully designed by the parents to teach their
children self-sufficiency, self-responsibility, and self-control. “In fact,
there are many approaches to parenting . . . and parents should have a
right to raise their children in a manner consistent with their means and
. . . values.”136 However, by imposing a loosey-goosey application of
Tinker to off-campus speech, school officials and courts are wielding
terrible power, restricting not only the student’s freedom of speech, but
the parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to life and liberty without state
intervention, and the primary parental “right to raise their children
according to the dictates of their own consciences,”137 wherein exists a
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”138
V. CONCLUSION
“[P]arents are empowered in order to protect children’s best

131. Id. at 7, 9.
132. Id. at 11.
133. Pimentel, supra note 118, at 11.
134. Id.
135. Killenbeck, supra note 111, at 893 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 444 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotations omitted).
136. Pimentel, supra note 118, at 18-19.
137. Samantha Godwin, Against Parental Rights, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2015)
(internal quotations omitted).
138. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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interests,”139 because “children lack the rationality to make key
decisions or to care for themselves adequately.”140 As such, “[t]he
Supreme Court has found that there exists a private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.”141 More so, this parental right extends not
only to the state and other adults, but to the parents’ own children.142
Therefore, the extent of parent rights extends not only to “how ideal
parents exercise their power to provide the effective care and guidance
children need,”143 but also to “[t]he extent to what the law enables
imperfect parents to do to their children.”144 If courts impose either the
“reasonably foreseeable” or “nexus” framework, they will inevitably
restrict the ability of an adult to parent a child through the imposition of
intensive parenting restrictions because “the system will effectively
force people to curtail their family size, chilling the exercise of their
fundamental right to procreate.”145 This is because these restrictive
“parenting norms [will] lead[] down a road [of] de facto prohibitions on
large families [because] . . . low-income families cannot afford to level
of intensive child care that would be required of them.”146 However, the
courts may avoid all of this by creating a new off-campus First
Amendment speech test, rather than applying the tests applicable to First
Amendment on-campus speech.
By creating a completely new test solely for off-campus speech,
Tinker and the specific exception created by the Supreme Court would
still apply to on-campus speech; however, the Supreme Court, and
courts thereafter, would be able to distinguish between on-campus and
off-campus speech and how best to handle any restrictions because “oncampus and off-campus distinction is becoming increasingly difficult
with the instantaneous nature of the Internet.”147 Furthermore,
considering whether the student’s off-campus speech has “special
educational qualities” will ensure that only student speech without those
special qualities are restricted. Finally, a new test will guarantee that
parental interest and rights in child rearing are not limited, restricted, or
violated.

139. Id. at 1.
140. Id. at 9-10.
141. Id. at 11 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (internal quotations
omitted).
142. Id. at 17 (“Parents’ right to control nearly every aspect of a child’s life is held not only
against the state and other adults, but also against their own children.”).
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Pimentel, supra note 118, at 33.
146. Id.
147. Boyd, supra note 1, at 1236.
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